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“Without wanting to appear arrogant or vain, which would be quite un-Canadian ...  
while our system is not perfect, it has worked during this difficult time” 
Finance Minister Jim Flaherty in an interview with the Financial Times
1 
 
Why are Canada’s “Too Big To Fail” Banks Risk Averse? 
Canada is emerging from the current financial crisis with a reputation as a “country that got 
things right”.
2 This is not to say that the Canadian banking system was unscathed by the 
financial crisis: extraordinary interventions to enhance systemic liquidity and other 
supportive measures have been put in place to help Canadian banks weather the financial 
turmoil.
3 
 But in contrast to the costly bailouts of large American banks and other financial 
institutions, no individual Canadian bank has required a government bailout.  Canada now 
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4 and influential critics have 
advocated for banking reforms inspired by the Canadian example.
5  
While the comparative resilience of the Canadian banking system is the result of a 
confluence of many factors,
6 considerable emphasis has been placed on Canada’s 
reputation for having cautious banking regulation and a risk averse banking culture.
7  
This brief focuses on the purported Canadian virtues of risk aversion and regulatory caution 
in light of one important characteristic of the banking system: it is dominated by only five 
large banks that are "too big to fail".  Scholarship on bank regulation regards banks that are 
"too big to fail" as having an incentive to take greater risks than they would deem 
acceptable if they were uncertain of receiving government support.
8 Thus banks that are 
"too big to fail" present a public policy problem in that they tend to privatize the rewards of 
risky banking behaviour, while its costs are socialized in the event that bank stability is 
threatened. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, public policy scholars and practitioners 
have renewed interest in the "too big to fail" problem, given that American authorities have 
been obliged to rescue the titans of the American banking (and other dominant financial 
institutions)  at great public expense.
9  As Alan Greenspan has recently commented, “of all 
the regulatory challenges that have emerged out of this crisis, I view the ["too big to fail"] 
problem and the ["too big to fail"] precedents, now fresh in everyone's mind, as the most 
threatening to market efficiency and our economic future.”
10  Thus Canada’s combination 
of banks that are "too big to fail" alongside a seemingly a risk averse banking culture poses 
an intriguing puzzle for scholars and practitioners of banking regulation. 
How did Canada avoid the heightened appetite for risk that is encouraged by the "too big to 
fail" problem? This brief addresses this question using a concept – constructive ambiguity 
– which is often mentioned but relatively neglected analytically in the scholarly literature 
on bank regulation.  This neglect is perhaps understandable given that regulatory 
scholarship generally values clarity and precision in pursuit of both transparency and 
accountability. I argue that the capacity of the Canadian banking system to thus far 
successfully navigate the "too big to fail"  problem presents an instance in which this form 
of ambiguity may contribute to helpful dynamics in the regulatory landscape in that it can 
attenuate the moral hazard dilemma posed by banks that are "too big to fail". 
When banks contemplate their risk exposure, they consider what government actions may 
be forthcoming in the event that these risks turn out so badly that the bank is imperilled.  
Banks certainly do not wish to find themselves in front of their prudential regulator (the 
Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions) or deposit insurer (the Canada 
Deposit Insurance Corporation) on the brink of failure.  A troubled bank would prefer that 
the central bank pre-empt this outcome by providing “lender of last resort” support or other 
forms of extraordinary assistance to enable it to recover.  Banks that perceive themselves as 
"too big to fail" expect that the central bank will exert itself on their behalf well before their 
Russell / page 2 failure is imminent. Thus, "too big to fail" banks have an incentive to take greater risks 
insofar as they expect the central bank to react favourably to them should they require 
urgent assistance.   
Constructive ambiguity exists to the extent that it is unclear  how the central bank will 
respond to the potential failure of a bank. A distressed bank hopes that the central bank will 
intervene to provide sufficient liquidity to prevent its failure,  but the central banks may 
allow other outcomes which are detrimental to the bank, including allowing the bank to 
fail.   To the extent that a bank has reason to fear that a future banking crisis may be 
resolved in a way that is unfavourable to its interests, it has an incentive to adopt a more 
conservative attitude towards its risk exposure. Thus, an environment characterized by a 
high degree of credible constructive ambiguity deters the migration towards increased risk 
exposure by all banks, including those which are perceived as "too big to fail". Moreover, 
this constructive ambiguity emboldens both central bank officials and bank regulators to be 
more assertive in their pursuit of both regulatory and non-regulatory interventions intended 
to support the stability of the banking system.   
I shall argue that the refusal to grant the big five Canadian banks permission to merge in 
the late 1990s preserved a greater range of viable policy options in the event of a banking 
crisis. With greater policy options at the government’s disposal, the constructive ambiguity 
was enhanced. Thus, despite the fact that Canadian banks are “too big to fail”, the moral 
hazard problems associated with banks that cannot be permitted to fail were reduced thanks 
to this constructive ambiguity. Moreover, a context characterized by a high degree of 
constructive ambiguity encouraged the evolution of both regulatory and non-regulatory 
factors that were conducive to the relative stability in Canadian banking amidst the recent 
financial turmoil. 
The argument below requires a short general presentation of constructive ambiguity and its 
relationship to the “too big to fail” problem.  It is followed by a discussion of the ways in 
which the refusal to permit mergers among the large Canadian banks in the late 1990s 
shaped the constructive ambiguity animating the relationships among the banks, the Bank 
of Canada, and bank regulators.  I will argue that this policy decision both enhanced the 
credibility of the government’s constructive ambiguity and attenuated the moral hazard 
implications of banks that are “too big to fail” in Canada.  I conclude with a discussion of 
the implications of this analysis for regulatory initiatives going forward.  
 
Contagion Risk and the “Too Big To Fail” Problem:  
The Case for Constructive Ambiguity 
Governments are keenly aware that banks are “special”.
11 Banks are critically important in 
an economy, but they also structurally vulnerable to failure.  Depository banks are 
Russell / page 3 necessarily highly leveraged: the amount of loans they extend far exceeds the amount of 
funds on deposit.
12  If depositors (and other creditors) fear the possible collapse of a bank, 
they will seek to withdraw their funds en masse, thus provoking the bank’s failure. For this 
reason, public confidence is imperative for bank stability. 
Bank failures are a particular concern for both regulators and central bank officials because 
they can ignite a sequence of harmful events that can jeopardize the survival of banks 
throughout the banking system.  These so-called “contagion effects” are more severe when 
very large banks fail.  Governments regard systemic contagion as a worst case scenario, 
largely because of its potentially devastating economic consequences. Instability in the 
banking system compels individual banks to protect themselves by contracting lending, and 
the resulting “credit crunch” can provoke generalized economic downturn. Indeed this fear 
of contagion and its economic consequences are among the justifications for the regulation 
of banking.
13   
In view of the potential contagion effects of bank failures, governments provide a “safety 
net” to preserve the stability of the banking system. This buttresses public confidence in the 
banking system, which deters the bank runs that threaten individual banks and potentially 
imperil the stability of the financial system in general and the banking system in particular. 
For present purposes, the analysis of this safety net focuses on the central banks’ role in the 
provision of liquidity, although the government could use other mechanisms to provide 
banks with funds to weather a crisis. 
14 In the event that a bank is in jeopardy, a central 
bank may allow the bank to borrow funds (or enable the bank to secure liquidity by other 
more circuitous processes). Since other for-profit firms do not have explicit access to the 
lender of last resort facilities at the central bank, this constitutes an obvious way in which 
banks are “special”. 
15 To the extent that banks are shielded from failure, banks are 
protected from this basic market discipline, a concern which further justifies the regulation 
of the banking sector. 
The existence of this safety net poses a moral hazard problem (that is to say, the prospect 
that a party insulated from risk may behave differently from the way it would behave if it 
were fully exposed to the risk).  To the extent that a bank believes it will receive assistance 
if it is in peril, the bank has a perverse incentive to migrate towards more risk exposure 
than it would otherwise deem acceptable.
16 This moral hazard is attenuated by the fact that 
central banks exercise discretion in allowing access to this safety net. A credible threat that 
a bank in peril may be denied lender of last resort support or face other adverse 
consequences curbs the appetite for risk among banks. Indeed, so long as authorities are 
persuaded that it will not jeopardize systemic stability,they may welcome a particular bank 
failure for its disciplinary effects. Yet government authorities face a dilemma: while the 
disciplinary effects of bank failures deter a cavalier attitude toward risk among remaining 
banks, there is always the possibility that a particular bank failure will unfold in a manner 
Russell / page 4 that will ignite contagion effects. This dilemma is evident in former chairman of the 
Federal Reserve Board Paul Volker comments: 
The 1980s exposed various excesses which I think, to some degree, were 
becoming apparent in the 1970s. I can remember very clearly sitting in my 
office then, as President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, thinking 
that what this country needs is a first-class bank failure to teach us all a 
lesson—but please God, not in my District. When I went to Washington, I had 
the same feeling—we need a clear lesson from market discipline, but please 
dear God, not in my country.
17 
To the extent that central banks can maintain a credible threat that a bank may be allowed 
to fail (or face other adverse consequences), they enhance systemic stability by deterring 
banks’ exploitation of the moral hazard dilemma inherent in the provision of the lender of 
last resort safety net.  The credibility of this threat is enhanced by a deliberate lack of 
transparency on the part of central bankers, who typically provide no policy statement 
concerning what circumstances will trigger a bank bail-out.  As a report from the Bank for 
International Settlements’ Working Committee on Financial Stability in Emerging Market 
Economies explains: “[a]ny pre-commitment to a particular course of action in support of a 
financial institution should be avoided by the authorities, who should retain discretion as to 
whether, when and under what conditions support would be provided”.
18 This intentional 
opacity on the part of central banks contributes to what is referred to as “constructive 
ambiguity” or “creative ambiguity”.
19  
While constructive ambiguity is a concept that is frequently employed,
20 financial 
regulatory scholarship has a somewhat uneasy relationship with it. Transparency is 
typically viewed as the hallmark of good regulatory governance rather than intentional 
opacity.   Indeed the reputed originator of the term, Gerald Corrigan, gives it a rather 
sheepish recommendation: 
While the doctrine of ‘constructive ambiguity’ as to whether, when and how 
central banks will resort to extraordinary actions in the face of financial 
disturbances is intellectually unappealing, it serves the very useful purposes of 
mitigating the moral hazard problems while preserving a desirable degree of 
policy flexibility.
21  
Constructive ambiguity is compromised by banks that are “too big to fail”. Since the failure 
of large and influential banks (“systemically important banks”), is likely to provoke 
contagion effects which may jeopardize the financial system in general, there is little 
ambiguity that some form of emergency support will be forthcoming should these banks be 
at risk of failure. Thus banks that are "too big to fail" are regarded as more susceptible to 
moral hazard difficulties, and a case can be made that banking systems characterized by 
Russell / page 5 Russell / page 6 
"too big to fail" banks are more prone to crises insofar as they exploit this moral hazard 
dilemma.
22 
Even if banks are viewed as "too big to fail", there may be options so that a central bank 
may avoid having to bail out a troubled bank. For example, regulators might force it into a 
distressed merger with its competitors on terms that are disadvantageous to the troubled 
bank.  If it is possible to avert bank failures while taking actions which punish banks 
viewed as culpable for the difficulties in the banking system, this threat mitigates moral 
hazard problems.
23  In an International Monetary Fund (IMF) publication, Guianni places 
particular emphasis on this punitive dimension of constructive ambiguity:  
[Constructive ambiguity’s] credibility rests on the availability of resources and 
high-quality information, as well as on sufficient technical autonomy and effective 
sanctioning powers.  The latter are really key: if institutions prove incapable of 
exercising self-restraint, then the lender of last resort must be in a position to inflict 
losses upon their managements and shareholders. If it did not have, or never 
availed itself of, such powers, constructive ambiguity would be a rhetorical fiction. 
Total forbearance would then be an apter name.
24    
The existence of credible constructive ambiguity may affect the behaviour of banks, even 
when banking crises are not imminent. Banks that are beholden to the good graces of a 
central bank in the event of a crisis are attentive to their reputation among government 
officials. Each bank prefers to be perceived as prudent and cooperative, rather than as an 
outlier in terms of its risk exposure.  Thus banks are more likely to heed moral suasion by 
government officials in everything from closed door meetings to public statements 
(“jawboning”).  
When the central bank is empowered with a high degree of constructive ambiguity, this 
context also has implications for the relationship between banks and their regulators.
25  
Banks that seek to maximize the likelihood of receiving emergency assistance in a crisis 
are eager to enhance their reputation as working constructively with regulators to promote 
systemic stability. Thus constructive ambiguity weakens (but does not remove) banks’ 
motivation to lobby to remove or dilute regulatory safeguards or to engineer financial 
innovations to circumvent such safeguards.  In this context, regulators are in a better 
negotiating position to impose regulations that banks might otherwise resist. Banking 
overseers (such as bank inspectors) are also better positioned to be more rigorous in the 
interpretation and execution of their mandates. Thus banking environments characterized 
by a high degree of constructive ambiguity may set in motion mutually reinforcing 
dynamics that support the stability of the banking system: governments are emboldened to 
advance regulatory and other measures that enhance systemic stability, while banks have 
diminished risk preference and are less inclined to apply their energies to reducing or 
evading explicit or implicit constraints on their activities.  
 
Constructive Ambiguity and the “Too Big to Fail” Problem:  
Legacies of the Bank Merger Debate  
The degree to which any central bank enjoys credible constructive ambiguity vis-à-vis the 
banking sector is shaped by a great many contextual factors, including the specific market 
conditions during an episode of banking turmoil, prevailing legal, policy and regulatory 
frameworks, formal and informal international agreements, the characteristics of national and 
sub-national regulatory institutions as well as domestic political considerations.  To investigate 
the degree of constructive ambiguity enjoyed by the Bank of Canada prior to the recent financial 
crisis, I limit my analysis to one important policy event: the refusal in 1998 to permit mergers 
among four of Canada’s largest five banks.
26  If these mergers had been permitted, the number of 
dominant banks in the Canadian banking market would have been reduced to three.   
While Canadian authorities have allowed some financial institutions with depository operations 
to fail in recent memory (such as Confederation Life and Central Guaranty Trust), the last major 
bank failure in Canada was the Home Bank in 1923.  Thus it appears that the major banks are 
rather secure in the assumption that they are too large and systemically important to be allowed 
to fail. While the 5 major banks were "too big to fail" even before the further consolidation,  the 
existence of 5 rather than 3 firms had an important impact on the range of policy options 
available to the Bank of Canada in the event of a bank in crisis. By preserving this policy 
flexibility, the prohibition on bank mergers preserved the constructive ambiguity enjoyed by the 
Bank of Canada in its relationship to the banks, and thereby mitigated the moral hazard problem 
inherent in Canada’s oligopolisticly competitive banking structure.   
I begin with the premise that any of the five major Canadian banks were (and are) "too big to 
fail", which constitutes an obvious impediment to the maintenance of constructive ambiguity.  
Since an outright bank failure could not be tolerated, some other resolution would have to be 
found if a Canadian bank were in jeopardy. As then Finance Minister Paul Martin explained in 
his statement rejecting bank mergers,
27 authorities have historically relied on the possibility of 
selling the operations of a troubled bank to its remaining competitors. This is not a course of 
action that the government would take lightly: concerns such as the level of competition among 
remaining banks would no doubt pose a significant problem to any government faced with this 
decision. However, in a worst case scenario this possible course of action is sufficiently plausible 
(and unattractive from banks’ point of view) to constitute a credible threat for a bank in distress. 
This credible threat acts to mitigate banks’ incentive to exploit the perverse incentives inherent in 
their "too big to fail" status. 
In a post-merger context, the possibility of dealing with a bank in difficulty by reducing the 
remaining number of banks carries different implications. If banking turmoil were resolved by 
reducing the number of Canadian banks from 3 to 2, this would trigger concerns about 
concentration of economic power and reduction in competition that flows from a highly 
page 7 concentrated banking sector.
28  If the government were to decide that a duopoly would be 
intolerable, it might resolve the situation by permitting the sale of the troubled Canadian bank to 
a foreign bank.  However, this option implies reversing a policy legacy which has enabled 
Canadian banks to maintain their dominant presence in the Canadian banking system.  (A further 
option would be to distribute a troubled bank’s operations among the smaller Canadian financial 
institutions such as smaller banks and credit unions.  But these smaller institutions are so 
dwarfed by the large banks that this option would require a vast retooling of the financial sector, 
and would likely be an unpopular outcome in the view of the remaining major banks.  Thus this 
option is absent from in the Martin statement.) 
In the event that a Canadian bank faced imminent failure, Canadian government authorities 
would thus face rather unattractive options in a post-merger context.  As Martin explained:  
Therefore, faced with a firm in financial difficulty, and with fewer large domestic 
institutions, we could find ourselves in a situation where we might have to put 
other fundamental policy objectives, such as the need for competition or Canadian 
control, into question in order to preserve our ability to address potential 
problems. 
In other words, the sheer size of the institutions that would result from these 
mergers would constrain the alternatives available to regulators and to 
government.
29    
In a post-merger context, the lack of attractive policy options undermines constructive 
ambiguity. Post-merger banks would be aware that the political and economic consequences of 
either permitting a duopoly or orchestrating the large-scale presence of foreign banks in the 
Canadian banking market are highly problematic for the Canadian government – particularly in 
the context of the fast-paced frenzy and convulsions of public confidence that prevail when a 
bank failure is feared. Facing a government with constrained policy options, post–merger 
Canadian banks would be more secure in exploiting their "too big to fail" status by increasing 
their risk exposure.   
A case can be made that the constructive ambiguity preserved by the refusal to grant bank 
mergers contributed to the creation of an environment that was conducive to the stability of the 
Canadian banking system prior to the recent financial crisis. For example, Canada has been able 
to impose and maintain higher capital ratios for Canadian banks (and at times banks have even 
exceeded the required capital standards) despite the fact that holding greater capital is a 
constraint on bank profits.  The requirement to hold higher capital dissuades banks from 
pursuing some of the riskier activities that require high leveraging and which thereby contribute 
to fragility in the banking system. While banks may have had other motives in acquiescing to 
these relatively high capital ratios, it may be that the credible threat implied by the Bank of 
Canada’s constructive ambiguity encouraged Canadian banks to embrace these standards. 
Russell / page 8 This is not to say that Canadian banks have found this environment inhospitable.  They have 
continued to be highly profitable in the time prior to the financial crisis, in part by regulatory 
design. A regulatory structure that seeks to encourage banks to forgo the more risky and exotic 
will tend to be sympathetic to the need to preserve the profitability of the more prosaic banking 
activities. 
30 Canadian banks have been supported by a regulatory structure that enabled them to 
create and preserve a lucrative and comparatively stable retail banking business, which has 
proven to be an important buttress of bank profitability during the financial crisis. 
 
Conclusion 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, regulators and policy makers have much to ponder about 
constructive ambiguity and systemic stability going forward. Numerous regulatory proposals are 
being considered in both domestic and international arenas to address the activities that 
heightened systemic risk in the time leading up to the financial crisis. But whatever the ultimate 
content of these regulatory and other initiatives, regulation intended to curtail systemic risk 
always suffers from the inability to perfectly anticipate future circumstances and the pressures 
they will exert on regulatory safeguards. Indeed, several generations of regulatory reforms (Basel 
I and II for example) were crafted to address the weaknesses in previous regulatory regimes, and 
in each case, new activities emerged which often compromised the intent of these regulations.  
Whenever it is profitable to circumvent regulatory safeguards, pressure builds to do so. 
This does not suggest we should abandon the attempt to craft new regulations that reflect the 
regulatory lessons of financial crises.  But because of the inability to perfectly foresee the 
weaknesses in new regulatory safeguards, governments must have other tools at their disposal to 
ensure that banks and other financial institutions conduct themselves in a manner that does not 
subvert the regulatory foundations of financial system stability.  This is particularly true when 
governments must regulate banks that are "too big to fail", for when these banks take advantage 
of unintended regulatory loopholes to exploit moral hazard problems, financial system instability 
becomes more likely.  
Thus, alongside any regulatory reform, regulators and policymakers should be mindful of the 
benefits of constructive ambiguity in incenting banks (and other financial institutions) to conduct 
themselves in a manner that is supportive of regulatory attempts to enhance financial system 
stability.  Governments need to reserve the ability to issue credible threats to financial 
institutions – particularly those that are "too big to fail" – should they behave in a manner that 
runs counter to the public interest.   
However, the credibility of constructive ambiguity has been undermined by the massive bailouts 
that many countries provided during the recent financial crisis. Constructive ambiguity has a 
“honeymoon period”
31 : the ambiguity concerning a central bank’s actions in the face of 
potential systemic risk is greatly attenuated or eliminated once the central bank’s response to 




                                                     
potential systemic instability has been observed.  Actions taken by central banks during the 
financial crisis allow market participants to discern what circumstances are likely to trigger a 
bail-out.  For this reason, observers like Feldman and Stern of the Federal Reserve Bank s
argue that constructive ambiguity is ineffective over the lo
These limitations on the credibility of constructive ambiguity in the aftermath of the most recent 
financial crises provokes concerns about the Canadian banking system going forward.  The Bank 
of Canada’s support of the banking sector during the height of the financial crisis, as well as the 
bail-out measures taken by other countries (particularly of their "too big to fail" institutions),  
have eliminated much of the mystery surrounding the probable course of action of the Bank of 
Canada during a future financial crisis.  
In the foregoing, I postulated and then argued in favour of the idea that credible constructive 
ambiguity supports cautious regulatory posture and conservative attitudes towards risk.  To the 
extent that constructive ambiguity has been undermined by the demonstrated willingness of 
central banks to support their "too big to fail" institutions, regulators and other policy 
practitioners should be cautioned against the assumption that the Canadian banking system will 
automatically replicate this relative resiliency in the future.  If regulators are to impose and 
maintain vigilant regulatory safeguards, and if financial market participants are to acquiesce to 
the both the letter and the spirit of these constraints, central banks and other government 
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